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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
David D. Hopper*
I. INTRODUCTION
Virginia courts and the General Assembly have effected a num-
ber of changes in civil practice and procedure during the past year.
This article focuses on some significant developments of interest to
the general litigation attorney. Matters affecting real property,1
juveniles,2 and construction laws are treated elsewhere in this
volume.
II. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Applying familiar principles of claim preclusion, the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Smith v. Ware4 held that a plaintiff whose
action for unlawful entry and detainer was dismissed was not
barred from pursuing an action to recover dower.5 The court ex-
plained that an action for unlawful entry and detainer is designed
to restore possession and award damages.' The dower action, on
the other hand, sought a different remedy and represented a differ-
ent cause of action.7 Consequently, even though the right to occupy
the property at issue had been based on the plaintiff's statutory
right as a surviving spouse to reside, rent-free, in the marital home
until dower was assigned," the court held that the two actions re-
* Attorney, Mezzullo & McCandlish, P.C., Richmond, Va.; A.B., 1983, magna cur laude,
Harvard University; J.D., 1989, Order of the Coif, University of Virginia.
1. See generally L. Charles Long, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Property Law, 27
U. RICH. L. REv. 805 (1993).
2. See generally Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues
Involving Children, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 783 (1993).
3. See generally D. Stan Barnhill, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Construction Law, 27
U. RICH. L. REv. 683 (1993).
4. 244 Va. 374, 421 S.E.2d 444 (1992).
5. Id. at 379, 421 S.E.2d at 447.
6. Id. at 377, 421 S.E.2d at 445.
7. Id. at 377, 421 S.E.2d at 446 (quoting former VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-37 (repealed 1991)).
Dower was abolished by VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.2 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-33 (repealed 1990).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
vealed neither "an identity of the remedies sought or an identity of
the causes of action."0 In Virginia Dynamics Co. v. Payne,0 an-
other case involving both unlawful detainer and claim splitting, the
court held that despite an automatic acceleration clause in a lease,
Virginia's unlawful entry and detainer statute1' allowed a landlord
to split its cause of action for rent.12 Moreover, the court held that
even if the statutory right to split a cause of action for rent could
be contracted away, the right would need to be "expressly waived"
with language beyond a mandatory acceleration clause.13
In Arkansas Best Freight System, Inc. v. H.H. Moore, Jr.
Trucking Co.,14 the court addressed the effect of a declaratory
judgment action concerning insurance coverage on a cross-claim for
indemnity in a wrongful death action. Under a trip lease agree-
ment, H.H. Moore provided Arkansas Best with a tractor trailer
and driver. Arkansas Best agreed to assume primary responsibility
to the public for operation of the vehicle, and H.H. Moore agreed
to indemnify Arkansas Best from any claims arising from opera-
tion of the tractor trailer.' 5 After an automobile accident involving
the tractor trailer, the estate of a passenger brought a wrongful
death action against the estate of the driver, H.H. Moore, and Ar-
kansas Best. Arkansas Best cross-claimed against H.H. Moore for
indemnification under the terms of the trip lease."
While that action was pending in state court, H.H. Moore's in-
surer, Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, instituted a declara-
tory judgment action in federal court against H.H. Moore, Arkan-
sas Best, the decedent's estate, and two other insurers. The federal
district court held that the indemnity provision of the trip lease
was unenforceable and that the Carolina Casualty policy did not
cover H.H. Moore for liability which it contracted to assume.'
In an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but
9. Smith, 244 Va. at 376, 421 S.E.2d at 445.
10. 244 Va. 314, 421 S.E.2d 421 (1992).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-128 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
12. Payne, 244 Va. at 318, 421 S.E.2d at 423.
13. Id. (citing McMerit Constr. Co. v. Knightsbridge Dev. Co., 235 Va. 368, 374, 367
S.E.2d 512, 515 (1988); VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone Star Indus., 215 Va. 366, 371, 209
S.E.2d 909, 914 (1974)).
14. 244 Va. 304, 421 S.E.2d 197 (1992).
15. Id. at 305, 421 S.E.2d at 197.
16. Id. at 306, 421 S.E.2d at 197-98.
17. Id. at 306, 421 S.E.2d at 198.
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made clear that it did not reach the issue of whether the indemnity
agreement was indeed unenforceable.' 8 Instead, the court of ap-
peals simply held that Carolina Casualty's policy clearly excluded
coverage. 19
Thereafter, in the wrongful death case, the trial court held that
Arkansas Best's crbss-claim for indemnity was barred by the doc-
trine of res judicata, based on the federal district court's ruling
that the indemnity agreement was unenforceable. 0 On appeal, the
court first noted that "a judgment which is being appealed is not
final for res judicata purposes .... ,121 Based on that proposition,
the court then held that because the court of appeals had found it
unnecessary to address the correctness of the district court's hold-
ing that the indemnity provision was unenforceable, there had
been no "previous, final adjudication of Arkansas Best's indemnity
claim .... ,22
B. Statutes of Limitations
In Starnes v. Cayouette,23 the court addressed whether a de-
fendant, against whom the applicable statute of limitations has
run, can acquire a vested right under the Virginia Constitution
that cannot be abrogated by a later statutory amendment applied
retroactively. The plaintiff, Starnes, was an adult who had been
sexually abused for a number of years during her childhood by the
defendant, Cayouette. The last act of abuse occurred in 1978;
Starnes turned eighteen in 1982.24 Starnes ified suit in July 1991,
bringing claims for assault, battery, sexual battery, rape, sodomy,
false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendant pled the two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury actions.25 Starnes responded that the issue was governed by
legislation that provided:
18. Id.
19. Id. at 308, 421 S.E.2d at 198.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 307, 421 S.E.2d at 198 (citing Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 413, 419, 417 S.E.2d
302, 304-05 (1992)).
22. Arkansas Best, 244 Va. at 307, 421 S.E.2d at 198.
23. 244 Va. 202, 419 S.E.2d 669 (1992).
24. Id. at 204, 419 S.E.2d at 670.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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In actions for injury to the person, whatever the theory of recov-
ery, resulting from sexual abuse occurring during the infancy or in-
competency of the person, [the cause of action shall be deemed to
accrue] when the fact of the injury and its causal connection to the
sexual abuse is first communicated to the person by a licensed phy-
sician, psychologist, or clinical psychologist. However, no such action
may be brought more than ten years after the later of (i) the last act
by the same perpetrator which was part of a common scheme or
plan of abuse or (ii) removal of the disability of infancy or
incompetency.
As used in this subdivision, "sexual abuse" means sexual abuse as
defined in subdivision 6 of § 18.2-67.10 and acts constituting rape,
sodomy, inanimate object sexual penetration or sexual battery as de-
fined in Article 7 (§ 18.2-61 et seq.) of Chapter 4 of Title 18.2.
[T]he provisions of subdivision 6 of § 8.01-249 shall apply to all
actions filed on or after July 1, 1991, without regard to when the act
upon which the claim is based occurred provided that no such claim
which accrued prior to July 1, 1991, shall be barred by application of
those provisions if it is filed within one year of the effective date of
this act.26
The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Starnes' suit and
held that to the extent that the Act of Assembly applied retroac-
tively to revive an otherwise time-barred claim, the statute vio-
lated the due process guaranties of the Virginia Constitution. In
so holding, the court relied on its opinion in Shifiet v. Eller" that
"'substantive' rights, as well as 'vested' rights are included within
those interests protected from retroactive application of stat-
utes. '29 The court held that the right to a statute of limitations
defense, where the statute has already run, is a substantive right,
thereby resolving an issue left open in School Board of Norfolk v.
United States Gypsum Co.30 In response to the court's holding in
Starnes, the General Assembly passed a joint resolution proposing
to amend Article IV, section 14 of the Virginia Constitution to in-
clude the following language:
26. Act of Apr. 3, 1991, ch. 674, 1991 Va. Acts 1273 (codified at 8.01-294 (Cur. Supp.
1993)).
27. Starnes, 244 Va. at 212, 419 S.E.2d at 675 (citing VA. CONsT. art. I, § 11).
28. 228 Va. 115, 319 S.E.2d 750 (1984).
29. Starnes, 244 Va. at 209, 419 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 120,
319 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1984)).
30. 234 Va. 32, 38 n.4, 360 S.E.2d 325, 328 n.4 (1987).
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The General Assembly's power to define the accrual date for a
civil action based on an intentional tort committed by a natural per-
son against a person who, at the time of the intentional tort, was a
minor shall include the power to provide for the retroactive applica-
tion of a change in the accrual date. No natural person shall have a
constitutionally protected property right to bar a cause of action
based on intentional torts as described herein on the ground that a
change in the accrual date for the action has been applied retroac-
tively or that a statute of limitations or statute of repose has
expired.3
1
In Vines v. Branch,3 2 the court addressed when an amendment
to a motion for judgment may relate back to the date of filing of
the original motion for statute of limitations purposes:
The general rule in this Commonwealth is that amendments will
be permitted where they seek determination of the same subject
matter of the controversy originally pleaded. Amendments will not
be allowed, however, when they raise a new substantive cause of ac-
tion which is different from that which the plaintiff asserted when
he or she first filed the action.
33
Vines' original motion for judgment, seeking return of her auto-
mobile, was dismissed with leave to amend. Vines' attempt to
amend her pleading to allege a cause of action for breach of an oral
contract was barred, however, by the three year statute of limita-
tions34 because her amendment did "more than merely 'vary the
mode of demanding the same thing.' ,,35 Vines' original tort claim
was for recovery of personal property and was therefore timely, re-
gardless of whether it fell within the relation-back doctrine.
Vines' second amendment, however, alleged an action for tres-
pass for the defendant's failure to return the automobile that had
been the subject of the original motion for judgment." The court
31. Act of Feb. 25, 1993, ch. 892, 1993 Va. Acts 1347 (amending VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
The 1994 General Assembly must reenact this provision, and it must be approved by a
statewide referendum before it is effective. See VA. CONST. art. X1I, § 1).
32. 244 Va. 185, 418 S.E.2d 890 (1992).
33. Id. at 188, 418 S.E.2d at 892 (citing New River Mining Co. v. Painter, 100 Va. 507,
510, 42 S.E. 300, 301 (1902)).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(4) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
35. Vines, 244 Va. at 188-89, 418 S.E.2d at 892-93 (quoting Painter, 100 Va. at 511, 42
S.E. at 301-02).
36. Id. at 189, 418 S.E.2d at 893.
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held that this trespass action alleged conduct directed at Vines'
property and was therefore governed by the five-year limitations
period for property damage injuries. 7
C. Expert Testimony
In three recent cases, the court addressed the propriety of ad-
mitting expert opinion testimony on a variety of issues. Relying on
the rule that only the jury may draw inferences from marks or deb-
ris in the roadway at an accident scene, the court in Brown v.
Corbin 8 held inadmissible an accident reconstructionist's testi-
mony that the absence of certain marks in the roadway indicated
that a vehicle had not been accelerating.3 9
The court in Brown also held that it was improper to admit tes-
timony from the reconstructionist suggesting that a police officer's
investigation of the accident was inadequate, and thus the police
officer's testimony was not credible. "The issue of a witness's credi-
bility falls squarely within the jury's province, and is one which a
jury can resolve without any expert testimony to assist it.''4° Fi-
nally, the court held that it was error to allow the accident recon-
structionist to give his opinion regarding the friction factors of the
road and shoulder surfaces when the record did not "show that he
arrived at the figures through any scientifically accurate tests or
formulas, but instead [showed] only that [he] estimated the fric-
tion on the surfaces on 'an August day.' ",41 The expert's opinion,
the court concluded, was thus "nothing more than speculation
"142
In Kendrick v. Vaz, Inc.,43 a plaintiff who had been injured
while pushing her daughter on a playground merry-go-round, sued
the property owner. The plaintiff attempted to introduce expert
testimony that the playground's surface material construction vio-
lated a national standard of care and that the surface was unsafe
37. Id. at 189-90, 418 S.E.2d at 894 (citing Pigott v. Moran, 231 Va. 76, 81, 341 S.E.2d
179, 182 (1986)). See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
38. 244 Va. 528, 423 S.E.2d 176 (1992).
39. Id. at 531-32, 423 S.E.2d at 179 (citing Lopez v. Dobson, 240 Va. 421, 423, 397 S.E.2d
863, 865 (1990)).
40. Id. at 532, 423 S.E.2d at 179 (citing Parker v. Davis, 221 Va. 299, 305, 269 S.E.2d 377,
381 (1980)).
41. Id. at 533, 423 S.E.2d at 179.
42. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 223 Va. 609, 614, 292 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1982)).
43. 244 Va. 380, 421 S.E.2d 447 (1992).
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because it was not constructed of a resilient material." The court
held that the testimony was properly excluded because the plain-
tiff's motion for judgment, which alleged the defendant's failure to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and the ab-
sence of a reasonable warning of concealed or unsafe conditions,
did not contain a specific allegation that the playground surface
was composed of an unsafe material.15 Moreover, the court found
that the testimony of the plaintiff and the playground's mainte-
nance engineer framed the issue in the case as whether there was a
hole in the ground and whether such a hole was an unreasonably
dangerous condition.46 Framed in this way, the court explained,
"the issue Kendrick presented, by her pleadings and her testi-
mony, was not a proper subject for expert opinion" because "the
jury was equally as capable as [the expert] of reaching an informed
"147opinion ....
In Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard,48 the court affirmed
the admissibility of testimony from a slip and fall plaintiff's oph-
thalmologist, who testified about her visual impairment at the time
of her accident.49 The doctor had examined the plaintiff's eyes sev-
eral months before the accident and again eight months later. He
testified that the plaintiff's poor vision in her left eye, as noted
during the pre-accident examination, meant that she did not have
depth perception. However, the doctor admitted on cross-examina-
tion that he could not determine whether the plaintiff had been
able "'to see the difference in depth between objects'" on the day
of the accident.50 The court nevertheless concluded that the expert
testimony was admissible as probative of the issue of what the
plaintiff could have seen at the time of the accident.51
44. Id. at 381-83, 421 S.E.2d at 449.
45. Id. at 384, 421 S.E.2d at 449.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Lopez v. Dobson, 240 Va. 421, 423, 397 S.E.2d 863, 865 (1990); Hill v. Lee,
209 Va. 569, 573, 166 S.E.2d 274, 277 (1969); Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 726, 146 S.E.2d
252, 254 (1966)).
48. 244 Va. 51, 419 S.E.2d 627 (1992).
49. Id. at 54, 419 S.E.2d at 629.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 56, 419 S.E.2d at 630.
1993]
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D. Photographic Evidence
The court in Brown v. Corbin52 addressed the proper foundation
necessary to introduce a photograph purporting to show a driver's
perspective as he approached an accident scene. In response to the
question of whether the photograph accurately depicted what he
had seen as he approached the accident scene, the driver re-
sponded that the photograph was "'somewhat similar to'" what he
had seen. 3 The court held that a "staged photograph purporting
to depict the circumstances at the time of an event . . . is in the
nature of a test or experiment which is offered for the same pur-
pose. ' 54 Consequently, to lay a proper foundation for such a photo-
graph, the party who offers it must demonstrate that it is "sub-
stantially similar, although not necessarily identical, to the actual
event in all of its essential particulars."55 Because the witness testi-
fied only that the photograph was somewhat similar and failed to
describe either the differences or the similarities between the pho-
tograph and the actual conditions and circumstances at the time of
the accident, the trial court erred in admitting the photograph.56
E. Medical Malpractice
In Fairfax Hospital System, Inc. v. McCarty,5" a case involving
a suit by the parents of a severely injured newborn against two
physicians and a hospital, the court addressed the interplay be-
tween the medical malpractice damages cap 5l and the statutory
provision governing the effect of release of one or more joint
tortfeasors.5 9 The parents made claims for the infant's injuries and
the mother's injuries, including an unnecessary hysterectomy and
emotional distress.60
52. 244 Va. 528, 423 S.E.2d 176 (1992).
53. Id. at 530, 423 S.E.2d at 178.
54. Id. at 531, 423 S.E.2d at 178 (citing 2 CHALES C. ScoTw, Photographic Evidence
§ 1101 (2d ed. 1969)).
55. Id. (citing Mary Washington Hosp. v. Gibson, 228 Va. 95, 99, 319 S.E.2d 741, 743
(1984); Habers v. Madigan, 213 Va. 485, 487, 193 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1973); Saunders v. Bul-
lock, 208 Va. 551, 558, 159 S.E.2d 820, 826 (1968)).
56. Id.
57. 244 Va. 28, 419 S.E.2d 621 (1992).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
60. 244 Va. at 30-31, 419 S.E.2d at 622-23.
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Before trial, all claims against the physicians were settled. The
settlement with the physician in charge of the delivery provided
for structured payments to the infant not to exceed $500,000. The
mother received $200,000 for her emotional distress claim and
$600,000 for her physical injuries. 1 She also settled her claim for
an unnecessary hysterectomy with a second physician for $150,000.
The mother then nonsuited her claim for damages against the hos-
pital in connection with the unnecessary hysterectomy.62 The case
went to trial on the infant's claims for his in utero injuries, the
parents' claim for the infant's medical expenses, and the mother's
claim for emotional distress.
6 3
The jury returned a verdict for the infant of $1,250,000. On the
parents' claim for the infant's medical expenses, the jury awarded
$1,500,000. On the mother's emotional distress claim, the jury
awarded $750,000. The trial court reduced the infant's verdict to
the $1,000,000 statutory malpractice damages cap and then by an
additional $500,000, reflecting the cost of the structured settlement
with the physician. 4 The trial court also refused to enter judgment
for the medical expenses award because that amount was subject
to the infant's malpractice cap, which had already been exhausted.
The mother's verdict for emotional distress was reduced to the
$200,000 amount allocated to that claim in her settlement with the
physician. 5
On appeal, the hospital contended that the verdict in favor of
the infant should have been reduced further by the $150,000 the
mother received from one physician for her hysterectomy claim
and by the maximum amount that the infant would be likely to
receive under the structured settlement if he survived in accor-
dance with his life expectancy.6 The court rejected these argu-
ments as contrary to the plain language of the release statute. The
$150,000 the mother received from one physician for her unneces-
sary hysterectomy claim was clearly not for "the same injury" as
the infant's claim for neurological damages.67 Moreover, the release
statute specifically calls for the trial court to consider the present
61. Id. at 31, 419 S.E.2d at 623.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 35-36, 419 S.E.2d at 625-26 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol.
1992)).
1993] 665
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
value of structured settlements when determining what credit to
apply. 8
The hospital also argued that the mother was not entitled to a
separate recovery for her emotional distress claim arising from in-
juries to the fetus. That argument ignored Bulala v. Boyd,69 in
which the court held that a mother could recover on a claim for
mental suffering resulting from the birth of an impaired child, 0
because "an unborn child is part of the mother until birth. '7 1
On a different issue the court in McCarty also held that the stat-
ute stating that the findings of a medical review panel are admissi-
ble evidence 2 does not allow admission of such findings concerning
a health care provider who is no longer a party to the litigation. 3
In Pierce v. Caday,7 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a
plaintiff's suit against a physician for unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information was governed by the Virginia Medical
Malpractice Act. 6 Therefore, the suit is subject to dismissal for
failure to give pre-filing notice to the defendant physician as re-
quired by the Act.76 Because the Act defines "malpractice" as "any
tort based on health care or professional services rendered, or
which should have been rendered, by a health care provider, to a
patient, 7 7 the court determined whether the plaintiff's cause of
action sounded in contract, as the plaintiff claimed, or in tort. 8
The court reasoned that because an "accurate medical history
furnished by the patient is an indispensable component of medical
treatment. . . receipt of that confidential information is 'an insep-
arable part of the health care . . . .11 Accordingly, the court con-
68. Id. at 36, 419 S.E.2d at 626.
69. 239 Va. 219, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990).
70. McCarty, 244 Va. at 37, 419 S.E.2d at 626-27 (citing Bulala, 239 Va. at 229, 389
S.E.2d at 675).
71. 244 Va. at 37, 419 S.E.2d at 627 (citing Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 66, 348 S.E.2d
233, 236-37 (1986)).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.8 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
73. McCarty, 244 Va. at 28, 419 S.E.2d at 621.
74. 244 Va. 285, 422 S.E.2d 371 (1992).
75. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.20 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
76. See id. § 8.01-581.2(A).
77. Id. § 8.01-581.1.
78. Pierce, 244 Va. at 289, 422 S.E.2d at 373. The court assumed the existence of a cause
of action for disclosure by a physician of information revealed in confidence by a patient. Id.
at 291, 422 S.E.2d at 374.
79. Id. at 291, 422 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting Hagan v. Antonio, 240 Va. 347, 352, 397 S.E.2d
810, 812 (1990)).
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cluded that the breach of an implied duty to maintain confidenti-
ality "should be judged like the breach of the general duty. Thus,
as with a violation of the standard of care generally, a breach of
the duty of confidentiality, 'resulting in damages, gives rise to a
cause of action sounding in tort against the physician.' ",8o Thus,
the plaintiff's claim for wrongful disclosure of confidential informa-
tion was a "tort based on health care" and malpractice under the
act."' Her claim was thus properly dismissed for failure to give pre-
filing notice as required by the Act.82
The court in Turner v. Sheldon D. Wexler, D.P.M., P.C. 3 held
that a medical malpractice plaintiff who gave the required statu-
tory notice prior to filing suit84 could not gain the benefit of the
medical malpractice act's statute of limitations tolling provision. 5
The court reasoned that at the time the plaintiff's cause of action
arose, the definition of "health care provider" under the act did
not include a professional corporation such as the one she had at-
tempted to sue.88 The court rejected the argument that Dr. Wexler
and his corporation "were so intertwined" that the professional
corporation should be "deemed" a health care provider under the
act.8 7
F. Personal Jurisdiction
In Gallop Leasing Corp. v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,8 the
court examined the applicability of the Virginia long-arm statute89
in a declaratory judgment action brought by an insurer against its
policy holder and an out-of-state lienholder on the insured's vehi-
cle. Nationwide sought a declaration that the policy it had issued,
and under which the lienholder had been added as an additional
insured, was void ab initio because of certain misrepresentations
allegedly made during the application process by the named in-
80. Id. (quoting Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 69, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120, cert. denied 474
U.S. 1013 (1985)).
81. Id. at 292, 422 S.E.2d at 374 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2(A) (Repl. Vol.
1992)).
82. Id. at 292, 422 S.E.2d at 375.
83. 244 Va. 124, 418 S.E.2d 886 (1992).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.2 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
85. Id. § 8.01-581.9.
86. Turner, 244 Va. at 126, 418 S.E.2d at 887 (citing former VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1).
87. Id.
88. 244 Va. 68, 418 S.E.2d 341 (1992).
89. V&. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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sured.90 Assuming that the lienholder had transacted some busi-
ness within the Commonwealth as required under the long-arm
statute,91 the court held that, because the lienholder was not al-
leged to have made the misrepresentations upon which Nationwide
based its claim, the declaratory judgment action was not one "aris-
ing from acts enumerated in" the long-arm statute.2 Accordingly,
the insurer could not use the statute to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the lienholder.
G. Release
In Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Ass'n,95 the court held
that a pre-injury release from liability for the negligent infliction of
personal injuries was void as violative of public policy, reaffirming
its holding in Johnson's Administratrix v. Richmond and Danville
R.R. Co."4 In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished cases
decided after Johnson that upheld pre-accident releases of prop-
erty damage and indemnity agreements related to such damage.
e5
H. Contempt
In Bagwell v. International Union, United Mine Workers of
America,9" the court resolved several issues that arose in connec-
tion with a circuit court's imposition of contempt fines on striking
coal miners and their union. During the course of a strike against
the Clinchfield Coal Company and the Sea "B" Mining Company
90. Gallop Leasing Corp., 244 Va. at 71, 418 S.E.2d at 342.
91. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1990).
92. Gallop Leasing Corp., 244 Va. at 71, 418 S.E.2d at 342 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-328.1(B)).
93. 244 Va. 191, 418 S.E.2d 894 (1992).
94. 86 Va. 975, 11 S.E. 829 (1890).
95. Nido v. Ocean Owners' Council, 237 Va. 664, 378 S.E.2d 837 (1989) (upholding con-
tractual waiver of property damage claims contained in condominium bylaws); Appalachian
Power Co. v. Sanders, 232 Va. 189, 349 S.E.2d 101 (1986) (because party asserting right to
indemnity from claim for personal injury was not negligent, it is not necessary to determine
the validity of indemnity clause); Richardson-Wayland v. VEPCO, 219 Va. 198, 247 S.E.2d
465 (1978) (upholding indemnity contract concerning property damage between Virginia
Electric Power Company and a private company for repairs on the company's premises);
Hiett, 244 Va. at 194-96, 418 S.E.2d at 896-97 (discussing C & 0 Ry. Co. v. Telephone Co.,
216 Va. 858, 224 S.E.2d 317 (1976) (upholding pre-accident release of property damage));
Kitchin v. Gary Steel Corp., 196 Va. 259, 83 S.E.2d 348 (1954) (holding that indemnification
agreement between contractor and subcontractor not predicated on negligence does not vio-
late public policy).
96. 244 Va. 463, 423 S.E.2d 349 (1992), cert. granted sub. nom. International Union,
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993).
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(collectively, "the company"), the company filed a bill of complaint
to enjoin the union from engaging in certain unlawful activities.17
After an injunction was issued and violated, the court established a
schedule of prospective fines for subsequent violations of its or-
ders. The court also appointed a special commissioner to collect
the fines.9 8 After the strike was settled and an appeal had been
made, the union and the company moved the trial court to vacate
the unpaid fines and dropped its appeal. The trial court, however,
refused to vacate those fines that were payable to the Common-
wealth and to Russell and Dickenson Counties, and the court of
appeals refused to allow Bagwell, as special commissioner, to inter-
vene before it as a new appellee.99
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia first looked to the or-
der appointing Bagwell as substitute commissioner and concluded
that he had standing to appeal the court of appeals decision vacat-
ing the fines. Bagwell was appointed "'in the place and stead of
the former special commissioners and as attorney to act in the
place and stead of the Commonwealth's Attorneys for Russell and
Dickenson Counties to collect all unpaid and unbonded fines
..) ,"100 The trial court's order also specifically gave Bagwell the
'authority to take all actions as may be necessary to collect the
fines including but not limited to the filing of legal actions, plead-
ings, notices, liens, . . . in any jurisdiction necessary to effect the
intent of this order.'"'o Based on this language, the court con-
cluded that Bagwell was the agent for the Commonwealth and the
counties in attempting to collect the fines.102
The court next held that the court of appeals had erred in refus-
ing to allow Bagwell to intervene in the appellate proceedings after
the company withdrew as appellee.10 3 In so holding, the court ob-
served that Bagwell, as special commissioner, was "the logical re-
placement for the [c]ompany" as appellee and that "the [u]nion
could not have been prejudiced by his intervention." 14
97. Id. at 466, 423 S.E.2d at 351.
98. Id. at 467, 423 S.E.2d at 351.
99. Id. at 467, 423 S.E.2d at 352.
100. Id. at 472, 423 S.E.2d at 354-55.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 473, 423 S.E.2d at 355.
103. Id. at 481, 423 S.E.2d at 360.
104. Id. at 474, 423 S.E.2d at 355.
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The court also held that the fines were clearly "civil" in charac-
ter and hence not violative of due process, because they had been
imposed in accordance with a prospective fine schedule in an at-
tempt to coerce compliance with the trial court's orders.105 The
court rejected the union's argument that fines imposed for viola-
tions of a prohibitory injunction were necessarily criminal in char-
acter.106 Finally, the court held that, because of the need to main-
tain "the dignity of the law and public respect for the judiciary,"
settlement of the underlying dispute could not render the fines
moot.10
7
I. Negligent Entrustment
In Turner v. Lotts,108 the court examined the doctrine of negli-
gent entrustment in an automobile accident case. The plaintiff's
motion for judgment included a claim that the owners of a motor
vehicle were negligent in allowing their son to operate the vehicle
at the time of the accident.109 In response to an interrogatory, the
plaintiff stated that the defendants knew their son was a reckless
and negligent driver "'as he had received three tickets for driving
infractions and had been involved in at least two wrecks, causing
[the defendants] to set up a different insurance policy for the mo-
tor vehicle being driven by their son ....
The court determined that a plaintiff who seeks to prove negli-
gent entrustment "must present evidence which creates a factual
issue whether '[t]he owner knew, or had reasonable cause to know,
that he was entrusting his car to an unfit driver likely to cause
injury to others.' """ The plaintiff must also prove "that the negli-
gent entrustment of the motor vehicle to the tortfeasor was a prox-
imate cause of the accident." '12 The court then held that summary
105. Id. at 480, 423 S.E.2d at 359.
106. Id. at 481, 423 S.E.2d at 360.
107. Id. at 478, 423 S.E.2d at 358.
108. 244 Va. 554, 422 S.E.2d 765 (1992). For an additional discussion of Turner see Rob-
ert E. Shepherd, Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Legal Issues Involving Children, 27
U. RicH. L. REv. 783, 803 (1993).
109. Id. at 555, 422 S.E.2d at 766.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 557, 422 S.E.2d at 767 (quoting Denby v. Davis, 212 Va. 836, 838, 188 S.E.2d
226, 229 (1972)(citation omitted)).
112. Id. (citing Denby, 212 Va. at 839, 188 S.E.2d at 229; Hack v. Nester, 241 Va. 499,
503-04, 404 S.E.2d 42, 43, rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 241 Va. 499, 508-09, 404 S.E.2d
42, 46-47 (1991)).
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judgment for the defendants based on the plaintiff's discovery re-
sponse was appropriate. 11 3
J. The "Fireman's Rule"
In Benefiel v. Walker,114 the court held that the common law
"fireman's rule" barring a culpable defendant's tort liability to an
injured fireman or policeman did not apply where the tortfeasor's
negligent acts did not cause the emergency that brought the police-
man or fireman to the accident scene. 115 Thus, a fireman who was
injured en route to a fire scene by a negligent driver and a police-
man who was struck by a negligent driver while standing beside his
police cruiser were free to pursue their negligence claims because
their injuries were a result of "'risks beyond those inherently in-
volved in firefighting or police work.' ,,116
K. The "Special Relationship" Doctrine
Burdette v. Marks117 was an action against a police officer for
failure to prevent the plaintiff's beating at the hands of a third
person. The incident occurred after Burdette stopped at an acci-
dent scene and attempted to prevent one of the drivers involved
from assaulting the other.:"' The attacker turned on Burdette,
beating him first with his fists and then with a shovel and an iron
pipe.119 During the course of the first attack, the defendant, Marks,
a uniformed deputy sheriff, arrived and witnessed the attack. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew the attacker and was re-
luctant to arrest him and that the defendant failed to come to the
plaintiff's aid, even though he asked for assistance.12
113. 244 Va. at 559, 422 S.E.2d at 768.
114. 244 Va. 488, 422 S.E.2d 773 (1992).
115. Id. at 495-96, 422 S.E.2d at 777.
116. Id. at 493, 422 S.E.2d at 775 (quoting Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., 232 Va.
177, 182, 349 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1986)). The court reached this conclusion even though there
had been testimony at trial that the risk of third parties colliding with a fire truck while it is
travelling to a fire scene is an ordinary risk encountered, in responding to a fire call. Id. at
494 n.5, 422 S.E.2d at 766 n.5.
117. 244 Va. 309, 421 S.E.2d 419 (1992).
118. Id. at 310, 421 S.E.2d at 419-20.
119. Id. at 310, 421 S.E.2d at 420.
120. Id. at 311, 421 S.E.2d at 420.
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Although a public official does not owe a legally cognizable duty
to the public to protect it from the criminal acts of third parties, 121
where a "special relation" exists between the public official and an
identifiable person, such a duty arises.122 The court explained that
in deciding whether such a special relationship existed, it was "im-
portant to consider whether Marks reasonably could have foreseen
that he would be expected to take affirmative action to protect
Burdette from harm.' 23 Using this test, the court concluded that
Marks owed Burdette a legal duty to protect him from attack. The
court based this conclusion on Marks' presence at the scene as an
on-duty, armed and uniformed officer, the apparent danger to Bur-
dette, and Burdette's request for help in fending off the
attacker.' 4
III. RECENT LEGISLATION AFFECTING CIVIL PRACTICE
The General Assembly enacted a number of measures during its
1993 Session which affect civil litigation in state courts.125 For ease
of reference, the discussion of these enactments is classified below
by subject matter.
A. Discovery
1. Depositions
Section 8.01-420.4 of the Code of Virginia was the subject of two
amendments relaxing the restrictions on the place where deposi-
tions may be held. The first amendment permits the deposition of
a nonresident, nonparty witness to be taken in the jurisdiction
where the witness lives or works, or at any other place agreed upon
by the parties. 26 The second amendment provides that restrictions
as to the location of the deposition do not apply if the defendant
fails to file a responsive pleading or make an appearance. 2 '
121. Id. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 421 (citing Marshall v. Winston, 239 Va. 315, 319, 389
S.E.2d 902, 905 (1988)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Unless otherwise noted, all provisions became effective on July 1, 1993.
126. Act of Mar. 22, 1993, ch. 428, 1993 Va. Acts 500(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
420.4 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
127. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 940, 1993 Va. Acts 1524 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
420.4 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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The General Assembly has also amended code section 8.01-412.4
relating to videotaped depositions to eliminate the prior require-
ment that such depositions be indexed by a time generator in or-
der to be admissible in a subsequent proceeding. 128
2. Subpoena duces tecum
Housekeeping legislation corrected apparent errors in the lan-
guage of former section 8.01-506.1129 by permitting the service of
subpoenae duces tecum in connection with debtors' interrogatories
upon any nonresident party or a nonresident party's attorney of
record. 130 The former language permitted service upon counsel
only in the case of nonresident "plaintiffs."' 3'1
B. Pleading
An amendment to section 16.1-88.03, effective July 1, 1992, inad-
vertently prohibited the longstanding practice which permitted
corporate and partnership employees to file certain civil pleadings
and papers in the general district courts without assistance of
counsel. 132 By two identical acts, the General Assembly has re-
stored the right of such persons to file warrants in detinue, distress
warrants, summonses for unlawful detainer, suggestions for a sum-
mons in garnishment, civil appeal notices and writs of fieri facias,
possession, and interpleader. 35
128. Act of Mar. 15, 1993, ch. 208, 1993 Va. Acts 236 (codified at V CODE ANN. § 8.01-
412.4 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
129. Consider the former section, which provided in pertinent part:
If the subpoena duces tecum is against a plaintiff who is not a resident of the
Commonwealth, but who has appeared in the case or been served with process in this
Commonwealth, the service may be on his attorney-at-law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-506.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992) (emphasis added).
130. Act of Mar. 17, 1993, ch. 267, 1993 Va. Acts 295 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
506.1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
131. See supra note 129.
132. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 814, 1992 Va. Acts 1308 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
88.03 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
133. Acts of Mar. 23, 1993, chs. 473 and 478, 1993 Va. Acts 567 and 572 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-88.03 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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C. Evidence
1. Presumption of Authenticity and Reasonableness; Medical
Bills
The General Assembly eased problems faced by personal injury
and wrongful death plaintiffs in authenticating and proving the
reasonableness of medical charges by adding section 8.01-413.01 to
the code. A rebuttable presumption of authenticity and reasona-
bleness regarding medical bills now arises in such actions when the
plaintiff: (1) identifies the original bill or an authenticated copy
and testifies as to the identity of the provider, (2) explains the cir-
cumstances surrounding the receipt of the bill, (3) describes the
services rendered, and (4) states that the services were received in
connection with treatment for injuries sustained in the event giv-
ing rise to the underlying cause of action.1 34 The operation of the
presumption has been limited, however, to instances where the op-
ponent or the opposing counsel has been furnished copies of the
records at least twenty-one days prior to trial.13 5
2. Expert Testimony; Adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The comparatively restrictive common law rule of evidence re-
garding the admissibility of expert opinions has been abrogated by
the statutory enactment of section 8.01-401.3 and the adoption of
the more liberal Federal Rule of Evidence 702.136 The former rule,
which disfavored opinion testimony and tended to restrict wit-
nesses to the restatement of facts, has often led to confusion over
what constitutes "fact" and what constitutes "opinion." The result
has led to contradictory holdings and criticism by both courts and
scholars.1 37
In addition, the code now permits a qualified expert or lay wit-
ness testifying in a civil proceeding to express any otherwise ad-
134. Act of Mar. 26, 1993, ch. 610, 1993 Va. Acts 610 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
413.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
135. Id.
136. Compare Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. Evm. 702.
137. See generally CHARLES E. FRIEND, EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA §§ 201-03, 214, & 219 (3d
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992).
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missible opinion or conclusion regarding any matter of fact, re-
gardless of whether that fact is critical to the resolution of the
case. 138 Witnesses are still prohibited from expressing opinions
which constitute a conclusion of law, and the exceptions to the "ul-
timate fact in issue" rule recognized in Virginia prior to the effec-
tive date of this statute remain in effect. 139
3. Physician-Patient Privilege
The scope of the physician-patient privilege in Virginia has tra-
ditionally been limited to barred compulsion of the physician's tes-
timony regarding information which was acquired in and necessary
to the course of treatment, without prior patient consent.140 The
General Assembly has expanded the privilege by amending Code of
Virginia section 8.01-399 to cover any matter learned in the course
of treatment. Where the patient's physical or mental condition is
at issue, disclosure is still required. However, it is limited to dis-
covery pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia,
testimony at trial, and where the trial court deems disclosure nec-
essary.1 41 Disclosure is further limited to those instances where the
patient fails to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the
subject matter is irrelevant or not reasonably calculated to lead to
discovery of admissible evidence.142 A blanket exemption pe'rmits
disclosures necessary in the course of treatment, in defense of
medical malpractice actions, as part of peer review procedures or
the operation of a health care facility or health maintenance organ-
ization, or as otherwise necessary to comply with state or federal
law.143
4. Competency of Witnesses; Age
The General Assembly added section 8.01-396.1 to provide that
"[n]o child shall be deemed incompetent to testify solely because
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.3 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
139. Id.
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
141. Act of Mar. 25, 1993, ch. 533 1993 Va. Acts 654 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
142. Id.
143. Act of Mar. 25, 1993, ch. 556, 1993 Va. Acts 709 (codified at V& CODE ANN. § 8.01-
399 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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of age."""' This provision essentially codifies the common lawrule. 14 5
D. Finality of Judgments
The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia permit a party to
note an appeal within thirty days of the entry of a final order by
the circuit court.146 Often a final order is entered without formal
notice to the parties, and counsel must bear the burden of making
periodic inquiries of the clerk to determine whether an order has
been entered. This system has pitfalls, and substantial hardship
and injustice can befall the party who, although diligent, is none-
theless without notice of an order's entry within thirty days. An
amendment to Code of Virginia section 8.01-428 provides some re-
lief. Where counsel, or a party appearing pro se, is not in default
and is not advised of an order's entry by any means, the circuit
court has discretion to grant leave to appeal. The court must be
satisfied that the lack of notice did not arise from the party's lack
of due diligence and that the lack of notice denied the party an
opportunity to appeal. Leave must be granted within sixty days of
the order's final entry.147
E. Immunity
1. Nursing Homes
A 1992 enactment required nursing homes, home care organiza-
tions, homes for adults, and adult day care centers to obtain crimi-
nal histories for all employment applicants. 148 Such facilities were
barred from employing persons convicted of certain crimes. 49 An
amendment to those provisions which were enacted under an
144. Acts of Mar. 22 and Mar. 26, 1993, chs. 441 and 605, 1993 Va. Acts 518 and 764
(codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-396.1 (Cune. Supp. 1993)).
145. See Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 840, 97 S.E.2d 14, 18 (1957). See gener-
ally CHARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 54 (3rd ed. 1988 & Supp.
1992). For a further discussion of the new code provision see Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law; Legal Issues Involving Children, 27 U. RICH. L. REV....
(1993).
146. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:9(a) (1992) (appeal to supreme court); VA. Sup. CT. R. 5A:6(a) (1992)
(appeal to court of appeals).
147. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 951, 1993 Va. Acts 1539 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
428(C) (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
148. Acts of Apr. 15, 1992, chs. 844, 17,657, 1992 Va. Acts 1583 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 32.1-126.01, -162.9:1 (Repl. Vol. 1992); 63.1-173.2 -189.1, -194.13 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
149. Id.
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emergency clause, 50 narrows the list of barrier crimes and provides
good faith immunity for those who administer the statute on be-
half of nursing homes,151 home care organizations,152 homes for
adults,153 district homes for adults,1 54 and adult day care centers.1 55
2. Chiropractors
Chiropractors now have the same statutory civil immunity as
other health care professionals when acting as team physicians, in-
vestigating complaints regarding the impairment of other profes-
sionals in the field, serving in a peer review capacity, or serving on
or providing information to a professional disciplinary
committee. 156
3. Free Health Services
The General Assembly has undertaken to limit the civil exposure
of hospital employees who deliver free health care to patients
treated in or referred from free clinics. Under the new statute,
Code of Virginia section 32.1-127.3, a licensed or certified employee
acting within the limits of her certification and at her place of em-
ployment is provided immunity absent gross negligence or willful
misconduct; the same immunity is applied to an employee who is
not required to be licensed or certified if her actions are within the
scope of her employment. In addition, such employees are deemed
to be acting in a governmental capacity as agents of the Common-
wealth, and are therefore covered under the Commonwealth's in-
surance, provided that the hospital has a written agreement with a
free clinic to provide care and is registered with the Virginia Divi-
sion of Risk Management, and the employee has no legal or finan-
cial interest in the referring clinic. 157
150. Act of Feb. 23, 1993, ch. 17, cl. 2, 1993 Va. Acts 15 (emergency act).
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-126.01 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
152. Id. § 32.1-162.9:1.
153. Id. § 63.1-173.2.
154. Id. § 63.1-189.1.
155. Id. § 63.1-194.13.
156. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 702, 1993 Va. Acts 982 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
66.12, -225.1, -581.13, -581.16, -581.19, -581.19:1 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
157. Act of Mar. 28, 1993, ch. 785, 1993 Va. Acts 1131 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-
127.3 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
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4. Anatomical Gifts
The Code of Virginia provides that recipients of organ trans-
plants and other anatomical gifts may employ or authorize a physi-
cian, surgeon, or other technician to take the appropriate steps
medically necessary to preserve the organ or tissues for transplan-
tation.15 8 An amendment enacted this session now provides civil
and criminal immunity, absent gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct, for persons who are employed or authorized by the
recipient. 159
F. Statutes of Limitation
1. Tolling Upon the Death of a Party
Previously, the code provided that upon the death of a party to
a cause of action, the statute of limitations would toll for up to one
year pending the qualification of a personal representative. 60 Sec-
tion 8.01-229 has been amended to increase the tolling period to
two years in such situations.' 6'
2. Open Accounts
Creditors suing on past due open accounts have frequently en-
countered difficulty with the applicable three-year statute of limi-
tation. Under former section 8.01-246,162 the limitation period be-
gan to run from the date of the breach, so that the limitation
period on an action to collect arrearages could expire before the
last payment was due. An amendment to section 8.01-249 now pro-
vides that the three-year limitation period begins to accrue on the
latter of the last payment or the last charge on the account.' 3
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-290 (Cure. Supp. 1992).
159. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 986, 1993 Va. Acts 1619 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-
290, -290.1, -292.1, -295, and 46.2-342 (Cure. Supp. 1993)).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(B)(5) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
161. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 844, 1993 Va. Acts 1223 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
229(B)(6) (Cure. Supp. 1993)).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
163. Act of Mar. 24, 1993, ch. 523, 1993 Va. Acts 646 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
249 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
[Vol. 27:657678
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
3. Residential Property Disclosure Act
The General Assembly amended code section 55-524 to provide
that any action on a disclosure or disclaimer statement required
under the Virginia Residential Property Disclosure Act must be
brought within one year of the date that the purchaser received
the disclosure or disclaimer. 164 If no disclosure or disclaimer was
received, the action must be brought within one year of the date of
settlement for sale transactions or within one year of occupancy for
leases with an option to purchase. 1 5
G. Alternate Dispute Resolution
Upon the joint recommendation of the Virginia State Bar and
the Virginia Bar Association, the Assembly enacted "mandatory"
alternative dispute resolution provisions.'66 Under this act, juvenile
and domestic relations courts, general district courts, circuit
courts, and appellate courts are empowered to refer contested civil
matters or selected issues to qualified neutral persons for resolu-
tion. The court may order the parties to attend an initial evalua-
tion session; all remaining participation is by consent of the par-
ties. 67 Any party, however, may file a written objection within
fourteen days. Upon the filing of an objection, the parties are ex-
cused from participation in even the initial, mandatory evaluation
session. 168
The initial evaluation is at no cost to the parties. Costs for sub-
sequent sessions are determined on the basis of agreement, indi-
gency, and assessment by the court.6 9 Provisions are also made for
confidentiality, 70 qualifications and duties of "neutrals,'' and
the finality and vacating of orders and agreements. 7 2
164. Act of Mar. 29, 1993, ch. 847, 1993 Va. Acts 1232 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524
(Cum. Supp. 1993)).
165. Id.
166. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 905, 1993 Va. Acts 1370 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-
576.4 to -576.12 (Cum. Supp. 1993)).
167. Id. § 8.01-576.4 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
168. Id. § 8.01-576.6.
169. Id. § 8.01-576.7.
170. Id. §§ 8.01-576.9, -576.10.
171. Id. § 8.01-576.8, -576.9.
172. Id. §§ 8.01-576.11, -576.12.
1993] 679
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
IV. CHANGES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA RULES
A number of changes of interest to litigation attorneys were en-
acted in Part V of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia dur-
ing the past year.
Rule 5:17(c), governing the form and content of petitions for ap-
peal, was rewritten to provide:
Under a separate heading entitled "Assignments of Error," the
petition shall list the specific errors in the rulings below upon which
the appellant intends to rely. Only errors assigned in the petition for
appeal will be noticed by this Court. Where appeal is taken from a
judgment presented in, or to actions taken by, the Court of Appeals
may be included in the petition for appeal to this Court. An assign-
ment of error which merely states that the judgment or award is
contrary to the law and the evidence is not sufficient. If the petition
for appeal does not contain assignments of error, the appeal will be
dismissed.
Under another separate heading entitled "Questions Presented,"
the petition shall list the questions upon which the appellant in-
tends to submit argument, with a clear and exact reference to the
particular assignment of error to which each question relates.
Where appeal is taken from a judgment of the Court of Appeals in
a case where judgment is made final under Code § 17-116.07, the
petition for appeal shall contain a statement setting forth in what
respect the decision of the Court of Appeals involves (1) a substan-
tial constitutional question as a determinative issue, or (2) matters
of significant precedential value. If the petition for appeal does not
contain such a statement, the appeal will be dismissed.
The petition shall also contain:
(1) A subject index and table of citations with cases alphabetically
arranged. Citations of Virginia cases shall be to the Virginia Reports
and the Southeastern Reporter. Citations of all authorities shall in-
clude the year thereof.'7
Rule 5:25 was amended to delete the last sentence of the rule,
which had provided that "[a]n assignment of error which merely
states that the judgment or award is contrary to the law and the
173. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:17(c).
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evidence is not sufficient.'"1 4 That language now appears in Rule
5:17(c).17 5
Likewise, Rule 5:27, governing the form and content of an appel-
lant's opening brief, was rewritten to provide:
The form and contents of the opening brief of appellant shall con-
form in all respects to the requirements of the petition for appeal
set forth in Rule 5:17(c), except that references shall be to the pages
of the appendix rather than the pages of the record. In addition, the
opening brief shall contain the signature and a certificate (which
need not be signed in handwriting) that there has been compliance
with Rule 5:26(d). 171
Finally, Rule 5:29 was redrafted to reflect the changes in Rules
5:17 and 5:27. Overall, these changes in Part V of the rules make
clear the requirements for briefs in the supreme court and reflect
the reality that an appellant's opening brief is often quite similar
to his petition for appeal.
174. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:25 comment.
175. V. Sup. CT. R. 5:17(c).
176. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:27.
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